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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 920492-CA
Priority No. 2

-vsMARK EDWARD McGRATH,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and/or constitutional provisions
are determinative or may be determinative of the outcome of this
appeal:

U.C.A. § 77-29-1, (1980, as amended).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED MR.
McGRATH'S RIGHT TO A TRIAL WITHIN
120 DAYS PURSUANT TO §77-29-1.

As pointed out in defendant's opening brief, an individual in
Utah who is incarcerated is entitled to be brought to trial within
120 days of his request for a disposition of the charges against
him.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953 as amended).
The State responds in its brief that the trial court did not

err in failing to bring defendant to trial earlier.

The State

relies upon two theories: that defendant's request for disposition

was "premature" and that he failed adequately to specify the
charges pending against him or the court in which the charges were
pending.
It is true that the defendant

filed his request for a

disposition pursuant to §77-29-1 in March of 1991, and that the
Information was not filed below until August 1991, some five months
later.

However, there is nothing in the statute, nor anything in

Utah case law, which would

indicate that the filing of the

information does not trigger the effects of the earlier request for
disposition, and result in a requirement that the defendant be
brought to trial within 120 days.
As of August 1991, a formal Information had been filed by
defendant. A demand for disposition of the charges which were the
subject of the information had been filed.
At his arraignment before the District Court Judge on January
10, 1992, the defendant told the judge that he had filed the
request for disposition, and that he intended to invoke the 120 day
time limit. Assuming, arguendo, that the State's position is true,
that the request for disposition was not effective when it was
filed, assuming that it did not become effective at the time the
information was filed in August, it certainly became effective on
January 10, 1992, when he stated to the court, to the prosecution,
and to everyone on the open record that he intended to invoke a 120
2

day time limit. Even if the time limit did not begin to run until
January 10, 1992, the trial court still violated the requirements
of the statute.

This

invocation

of

the requirement

for a

disposition would have required that defendant be brought to trial
by no later than May 10, 1992. His trial did not occur until June.
This Court should interpret §77-29-1 as allowing for a reinvocation of a prior written demand for speedy disposition, if the
demand is inadvertently filed before a formal Information is filed.
This court should find that the defendant's trial should have
commenced, if at all, by no later than May 10, 1992.

POINT II. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUF^ IN
THE DEFENDANTS CONVICTION OF TP*1
xME
OF THEFT BY RECEIVING AS A MATTEL or JM.
A.

The defendant has properly briefed this issue
to the trial court.

Defendant acknowledges his obligation to marshall the evidence
in favor of the verdict, and to demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient.

Defendant has done so, and will continue to do so,

in his briefs.
In his opening brief, defendant pointed out in the Statement
of Facts, that the incriminating evidence against defendant (with
citation to the record) was substantially as follows:
3

a.

that defendant had gone with Linda Steadman and with

Mr. Corey Brooks to a store on January 22, 1991, in a red
pickup truck, that the defendant drove, and that the defendant
gave Ms. Steadman $300.00 to buy a pistol at the store, (Tr.
June 1, 1992, pp.137-141); and
b.

that Corey Brooks went to the Vert home on January

28, 1991, to look at a diamond ring, and that he was carrying
a hand-held CB radio. This same man returned to the Vert home
on the morning of January 29, 1991, with the same radio,
pointed an automatic pistol at Stephanie Vert, handcuffed her
to the pipes in her basement bathroom, went through the house
taking all the jewelry, and spoke on the radio to some other
person shortly before leaving the home, (Tr. June 1, 1992,
pp.64-66); and
c.

That a Bill Anderson observed the pickup truck

parked a couple of blocks away from the Vert residence on
January 28, 1991. He observed a man matching the description
of Corey Brooks get out of the pickup, walk to the Vert
residence, and enter the Vert home. This was the same evening
that Stephanie Vert had been talking to Mr. Brooks about the
purchase of her diamond ring (Tr. June 1, 1992, pp.115-116).
The witness, Mr. Anderson, thought that a female person
remained in the vehicle while Mr. Brooks went into the Vert
4

home.

Mr. Anderson was unsure of the color of the pickup

truck, (R.O.A. 490); and
d.

the witnesses, Kim Fisher and Rodney Langenbacker,

identified Mark McGrath as the person who was driving Corey
Brooks around in a red pickup truck on January 29, 1991, the
day of the robbery.

They testified that defendant and Corey

Brooks stopped at their home where Corey Brooks showed the
witnesses some jewelry out of his attache case. It was later
established at trial that some of the items in the attache
case matched a list made by Ms. Martha Vert of jewelry taken
from her home. In particular, there was a marquis cut diamond
ring.

Mr. Langenbacker testified that Mr. Brooks admitted

having committed the robbery, when a news account of the
robbery was broadcast on television during their visit. Corey
Brooks gave the witnesses a costume jewelry chain when Rodney
Langenbacker told him that the chain was not made of real
gold.

Martha Vert later identified the chain as part of the

jewelry that had been stolen from her home, (Tr. June 1, 1992,
pp.73-77); and
e.

Mr. McGrath was not involved in any discussions

about theft or sale of the jewelry with Kim Fisher or Rodney
Langenbacker, (Tr.

June 1, 1992, pp.75, 11.16-24 and pp.90-

91) .
5

This is a summary of all the testimony against the defendant
at trial, and constitutes an adequate marshalling of the evidence
against the defendant.

The State, in its own brief, cannot cite

any further evidence, that the defendant was guilty of the crime
charged.
This certainly constitutes an adequate marshalling of the
evidence against defendant, to satisfy the requirements of Utah
appellate procedure.

B.

On the merits, the State failed to prove the
charges against defendant as a matter of law.

When the foregoing evidence is analyzed, it is clear that the
prosecution failed to establish the elements of second degree
felony theft by receiving as a matter of law.
The elements of theft by receiving, are as follows:
1.

that defendant received, retained or disposed of

another's property;
2.

knowing or believing that the property had been

stolen;
3.

with the intent to deprive the owner thereof; and

4.

that the property was valued at over $1,000.00.

Assuming all of the evidence as cited by the prosecution at
trial and by the State in its brief, it is still insufficient to
6

meet these four elements.

That Mr. McGrath purchased a pistol on

January 22, 1991, is not evidence that he intended to have anything
to do with the robbery of the Vert home one week later, or with
receiving stolen property taken in that robbery after the fact. In
fact, the defendant's purchasing of a weapon one-week prior to the
robbery, (even if he did so with the intent to give it to Corey
Brooks, or even if he did so and then permitted it to fall into the
hands of Corey Brooks) has nothing to do with receiving stolen
property. Defendant's purchase of the weapon, even if the State's
version is to be believed, is wholly irrelevant to the crime
charged and should not even have been permitted into evidence at
trial.

Had defendant had effective assistance of counsel, the

introduction of any evidence pertaining to purchase of the weapon
would have been excluded at trial on a defense motion.
The

fact

that

the

prosecution

continues

to

cite

the

defendant's purchase of a weapon as having anything to do with the
elements of the crime charged supports the defendant's claim. The
prosecution is attempting to prove that the defendant aided and
abetted the robbery, by obtaining the robbery weapon ahead of time
and giving it to the robber. The prosecution is then attempting to
bootstrap this evidence of aiding and abetting a robbery into a
conviction for receiving stolen property.
The second item of evidence upon which the State relies to
7

support the conviction is that Mr. McGrath drove the robber, Mr.
Brooks, during his efforts to sell the jewelry.

As noted in the

citation to the record above, the witnesses who verify that Mr.
McGrath was driving Mr. Brooks on January 29, 1991, say that he
(the defendant) was not involved in any discussions about the theft
or sale of the jewelry.

He was simply present with Mr. Brooks.

Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not a criminal act.
Association with people who are intending to commit a crime or who
have committed a crime is not in and of itself a criminal act.
Defendant's association with and physical proximity to Corey Brooks
on January 29, 1991, does not mean that he was involved in any
crime being perpetrated by Mr. Brooks on that occasion.

All that

the State's evidence can prove is that defendant was present at the
scene while Mr. Brooks committed the crime of attempting to sell
stolen property.
Crucially, none of the evidence adduced at trial and nothing
cited in the State's brief can verify that defendant here knew the
jewelry in Mr. Brooks attache case was stolen. Absolutely nothing
places the jewelry in the physical possession of the defendant at
any point in time.

Absolutely nothing places any of the proceeds

of the sale of the jewelry in the possession of the defendant at
any time.
The State cannot prove that the defendant received or retained
8

or disposed of property belonging to the Verts. The State cannot
prove that the defendant knew that the property in the possession
of Mr. Brooks was stolen property.
The State cannot prove that the defendant ever intended to
possess stolen property or ever received any value for stolen
property.
Hence, even though Mr. McGrath was not seen or identified as
being at the Vert house on January 28 or 29, 1991, the two
occasions when Corey Brooks entered the Vert home, the prosecution
was permitted to argue the irrelevant point that he was present
during all other "significant incidents in preparation for the
robbery and after the robbery for the sale of the jewelry." There
is no evidence putting the jewelry in the possession of Mark
McGrath, nor proceeds from the jewelry in the possession of Mark
McGrath, nor knowledge of the fact that the jewelry had been stolen
into the mind of Mark McGrath.

The prosecution nonetheless

obtained a conviction for receiving stolen property.
The verdict must fail as a matter of law, and the defendant is
entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

POINT III. DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED BY EXTENSIVE AND
PERVASIVE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, WHICH
HE HAS ESTABLISHED ON A BASIS OF "PLAIN
ERROR."
9

Defendant cited

in his opening brief numerous statutory

obligations, case law obligations and ethical obligations imposed
upon a prosecutor in a criminal case.

The State makes light of

these obligations, brushing them off as "broadly-cast. . . case
laws and

rules

about

prosecutors' ethical

(State's brief at p.20).

responsibilities."

These broadly-cast laws and rules are in

fact the constitutional provisions and ethical requirements which
prevent

a much

better

financed,

better

equipped

and

better

organized governmental agency from running rough-shod over the
rights of an individual.

The State does not deny, in principal,

that these ethical obligations exist.
The State also does not deny that a prosecutor (or any lawyer)
has an ethical obligation not to introduce in trial any evidence
which he does not reasonably believe is relevant. Defendant argued
in his opening brief that the prosecutor committed misconduct, at
a level of plain error, by using inadmissible evidence to convict
him.

This evidence is as follows:
a.

the prosecution introduced evidence that Mr. McGrath

had bought a gun eight days before he was alleged to be in
intentional possession of stolen property.

The gun had

absolutely nothing to do with the offense charged.
prosecution

nevertheless

plowed
10

ahead

with

The

introducing

evidence of the gun, despite the fact that it was not
reasonably relevant; and
b.

the prosecution adduced at trial all of the gory

details regarding the Vert robbery.

They had a young and

sympathetic woman describe being victimized in a horrible
crime, being held at gunpoint and handcuffed to pipes in her
basement.

Again, this had absolutely nothing to do with Mr.

McGrath. He was never placed at the scene in any manner. The
actions of Mr. Brooks in terrorizing the Vert family have
nothing to do with Mr. McGrath7s alleged conduct in receiving
stolen property.

It was wholly irrelevant. Nonetheless, the

prosecution again plowed ahead to make repeated references to
the robbery.
Most importantly, the State does not deny in its brief that
the standard to be used in assessing the improper statements of the
prosecution is one of reasonable doubt.

Since the prosecutor

cannot prove his comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant is entitled to a new trial.

(State v. Terafa, 720

P.2d 1368 (Ut. 1986).
This

conduct

constituted

plain

error,

for

which

the

defendant's conviction should be reversed.

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE A
MISTRIAL.
11

It is apparently undisputed, on the status of the briefing,
that evidence which was not admitted at trial nonetheless made its
way into the jury room during the jury deliberations.
It was certainly error for the court to permit extraneous
material into the jury room during deliberation. The only question
remaining is whether the court abused its discretion in denying the
defendant's mistrial motion.
The State relies upon the trial court's cautionary instruction
that the document was to be used for impeachment purposes only, in
curing this error.

This appellate court must keep in mind the

context in which the transcripts were coming in. The witness, Ms.
Steadman, was permitted to testify as to the wholly irrelevant fact
that Mr. McGrath had participated in purchasing a weapon over one
week before the Vert robbery.
police, and testified

Ms. Steadman gave one statement to

differently

at trial.

The tapes and

transcripts were introduced by the prosecution to impeach her, to
demonstrate that she had changed her testimony at trial to be more
favorable to the defendant.

It is highly likely that all of this

confused the jury deliberation process in any event, since Ms.
Steadman7s testimony had nothing to do with the crime for which
defendant was charged in the first place. The jury was nonetheless
permitted to hear her testimony and to hear the tape recording of
12

her prior statement, and to review the transcript of her prior
statement, all of which was plain error in the first place.

The

jury was then further confused on the issue by having their
transcripts confiscated in the middle of their deliberations. They
were given an instruction which must be confusing to a layman
(since so few who are law trained apparently understand the
distinction) that Ms. Steadman's tapes were to be used only for
impeaching her testimony and not for any substantive purpose.
By this time, the whole issue of the irrelevant testimony, the
inadmissible tapes, and the "correcting" instruction would have so
hopelessly confused the jury in their deliberation on the real
issue (whether defendant had received stolen property) that it must
constitute an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have
denied the mistrial.

POINT V.

DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE BY TRIAL COUNSEL.

It is apparent, after a review of the briefing to date, that
the parties to this appeal agree regarding the two-element standard
used to assess a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
objectively
deficiency.

Defendant must prove that counsel's performance was
deficient, and

that

prejudice

resulted

from the

It is also undisputed that an appellant typically

cannot raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claimed for the
13

first time on appeal, but that he may do so if the record is
adequate, in order to permit determination of issues by the
appellate court and where there is new counsel on appeal. This is
the circumstance in the case now before the court.
The first claimed error by the defendant is the failure of his
counsel to permit him to testify at trial.

The State takes

exception with the manner in which defendant raises this issue.
The State claims that this allegation is unsupported by the trial
record, and is raised only in an ex-parte affidavit, which is an
addendum to defendant's brief on appeal.
If this Court supports, as a wholesale proposition, that a
defendant may never raise claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this manner, then the court makes it impossible for
defendant to raise this issue as a practical matter either in the
trial court or on appeal.

It is highly unlikely that a trial

attorney, having rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in the
first instance, will then admit to this error (subjecting himself
to malpractice liability) to present the issue at the trial court
level.

Since trial courts generally require that those who are

represented by counsel go through counsel in presenting arguments
to the court, there is no effective manner in which a defendant
who believes he is being misrepresented by counsel can get the
issue to the attention of the trial court.
14

The next stage at which a defendant might reasonably have
review of the problem is upon appeal, with new counsel appointed
because he has finally been able to complain to the trial court or
the appellate court about the effectiveness of his predecessor
counsel.

This makes the record at the trial court inadequate, in

part because of the very ineffectiveness which the defendant
complains about in the first place.

Unless the defendant is

permitted to address to the court the issues which bother him in
the form of an affidavit, the issue will effectively escape
appellate review.
The defendant's affidavit should not be stricken from the
record.

Either on the basis of the record the court should grant

defendant's appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
In the alternative, if the affidavit itself and the allegations in
the affidavit cause the court any concern, then the matter should
be remanded to the trial court pursuant to motion, to take further
evidence now that Mr. McGrath has counsel who will pursue this
issue.

This would grant the trial court the opportunity to

determine the allegations raised in the affidavit, and would permit
the State an opportunity meet the issue.
Defendant

further

asserts

that

his

trial

counsel

was

deficient, in the manner in which the trial itself was conducted.
As noted above, the State was permitted, without objection
15

from defense counsel and without action by the court, to present
extremely prejudicial testimony which was wholly irrelevant to
defendant's prosecution, including that he had purchased a weapon
a week before a robbery which had no relevance to the crime charged
against him, and that another party who had been in the company of
the defendant had committed the robbery. To fail to object to this
evidence was clearly a deficient performance on the part of defense
counsel, especially since counsel could have done so in a motion
outside the presence of the jury, without impacting the opinion of
the jury at all on these issues.
Finally, there is more than a "reasonable probability" that,
but for counsel's errors, the result at the trial level would have
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and
State v. Frame, 723 P. 2d 401 (Ut., 1986).

The State essentially

concedes this argument in its appeal brief.

At page 23 of the

brief, the State admits: "There is merit to McGrath's contention
that the now-challenged evidence [regarding the gun purchased and
the robbery] harmed his defense. This was a rather close case; the
jury required eight hours to reach its verdict.

(R.236).

Without

the now-challenged evidence, the State might not have prevailed at
trial."
Evidence regarding the gun purchase and the details of the
robbery were clearly irrelevant to the crime of receiving stolen
16

property.

They were also inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence,

Had counsel simply objected, there is a high

likelihood that the trial court would have sustained the objection.
There is also a high likelihood that, had the trial court denied
the objection, this Court would have found that to be reversible
error.

Defendant's counsel did not object, and permitted vast

quantities of irrelevant material of a highly prejudicial nature to
come before the jury.
Because defendant can establish both prongs of the test
necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and
because he can establish, by the State's own admission, that this
ineffective assistance of counsel had an impact on the outcome of
his case, he is entitled to a new trial.

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED THREAT
AGAINST THE STATE'S WITNESS.

The defendant objected at trial to the testimony of the
witness, Ms. Steadman, to the effect that the defendant had
threatened her prior to the trial.

The evidence came in.

The State, in its brief, argues that the threat in question
was relevant to prove the element of the offense charged that
17

defendant

had

knowingly

participated

with

Corey

Brooks

in

possessing or disposing of the jewelry stolen in the Vert robbery.
The State claims that, by threatening the witness, defendant
demonstrated awareness that the jewelry was stolen.

This is not

the case.
It is uncontroverted that the defendant was on parole for an
earlier offense at the time of the Vert robbery. Certainly, he was
aware at the time of the robbery that any hint of his involvement
in any criminal activity, or any indication that he had been
involved in the purchase of a weapon, or any indication that he was
consorting with known felons might violate his parole. He may have
threatened the witness to keep quiet about the purchase of the gun,
or his friendship with Corey Brooks, solely out of fear of having
his parole violated, and not for any purpose having anything to do
with the crime of receiving stolen property.
In fact, Ms. Steadman was the witness who could not do
anything to place defendant at the scene of the robbery or in
possession of stolen jewelry. All she could do was put him in the
presence of a gun similar to the one used in the robbery.
Under all of these circumstances, the evidence of the threat
was irrelevant, even to prove the element of mens rea,
by the State.

as alleged

The court committed reversible error in permitting

this evidence to go before the jury.
18

POINT VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN INCORRECTLY CHARGING THE JURY.

It is undisputed, that the jury was instructed, they were
instructed that the defendant was charged with being "armed with a
dangerous weapon, to wit: a gun, . . . "

at the time of the

offense. (This court should consider, in relation to the effective
assistance of counsel argument, why defendant's trial counsel did
not object to this reading of an incorrect Information to the
jury.)
Later, in instructing the jury as to the specific elements of
the offense, the court did not mention the question of a weapon.
The prosecution itself did not object to this incorrect
Information

being

read

to

the

jury, either.

Further, the

prosecution continued, throughout the trial, to introduce improper
evidence to the jury, in the form of evidence that the defendant
had bought a gun and been in the presence of someone who had
performed a robbery with a gun.
It is not surprising that, in mid-deliberation, the jury
indicated it was confused.

At this point in time, the following

had happened to the jury:
a.

they had been incorrectly

instructed about the

nature of the charges against the defendant; and
19

b.

they had heard copious amounts of evidence about the

defendant having a gun, about defendant allegedly threatening
a witness and a robbery; and
c.

the jury had one batch of evidence (the transcript

of the tape-recorded telephone conversation with Ms. Steadman)
admitted into the jury room and then confiscated; and
d.

the jury then encountered an instruction which had

a material difference from the Information which they had been
told had been charged against the defendant.
Under all of these circumstances, one would expect the jury to
be hopelessly confused.

At this point, no length or manner of

instructing could correct all of the problems.
defective.

The verdict was

Defendant was deprived of his right to due process.

With all this multiplicity of errors, the court must assume
prejudice and find that the trial court committed plain error in
instructing the jury in this manner.
Moreover, the "corrective" instruction to the jury regarding
the inaccurate Information might alert a sophisticated juror to the
fact that the defendant had been previously charged with aiding and
abetting the robbery, that the documents had been amended to
include the less serious offense upon which the defendant was
bound-over, but that the documents had not been corrected on the
word processor used to print the amended Information.
20

This might

then give rise in the mind of a sophisticated juror to begin
speculating to other jurors about what kind of evidence the State
had to cause them to believe that the defendant was involved in the
robbery.
The State in its brief asserts that this error is "ironically"
the type of error which, if uncorrected, could have aided Mr.
McGrath.

This might be true, had the prosecution not previously

and in violation of its ethical obligations introduced substantial
irrelevant evidence connecting defendant to a gun and an armed
robbery.

It is a greater leap of faith to assume that this error

assisted the defendant, than to assume that it was prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant is entitled to the
following relief, in the alternative:
1.

the Court should dismiss the charges against the

defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §77-29-1

(1953 as

amended); or
2.

the Court should grant the defendant a judgment of

acquittal, because the State failed to sustain its burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law; or

and

3.

the defendant should have his conviction set aside

the

matter

remanded

for
21

a

new

trial, based

upon

ineffective assistance of counsel, and the numerous errors
committed in the trial court as set forth above; or
4.

the defendant is entitled to have the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel remanded to the trial court,
upon motion, to here and make finding upon the question of
whether

the

defendant

was

improperly

prohibited

from

testifying at trial by his former counsel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1994.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS
MARY C. CORPORON
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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